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ABSTRACT
Nigeria has been on a long-winding journey to reform its petroleum sector with no end in sight. The first version of the reform bill, the petroleum 
industry bill (PIB) was sent to the National Assembly in 2008. The sustained opposition to the PIB from both indigenous and international oil companies 
as well as other stakeholders led to the decision, in 2016, to balkanize it into four bills, with each bill focusing on an aspect of the reform. The first of 
the quadripartite bills, the petroleum industry governance bill (PIGB) was passed by both chambers of Nigeria’s National Assembly and transmitted 
to the president for assent. The president declined assent, thus deepening the uncertainty that characterizes the sector. Drawing data from primary and 
secondary sources, the paper evaluates the trajectory of Nigeria’s petroleum sector reform, including the long delay and its impact on the sector. It 
finds that the delay in passing the reform bills has negatively rubbed off on the country as it has stymied growth and closed off new investments. The 
paper advocates the depoliticization of the reform agenda in order to reposition the country’s petroleum sector for national development.
Keywords: Petroleum Sector Reform, Petroleum Industry Governance Bill, National Development, Nigeria 
JEL Classifications: P28, P48, Q35, Q38, Q48
1. INTRODUCTION
Oil occupies an important place in the political economy of Nigeria. 
For one, Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and the tenth 
largest in the world. Secondly, it is the major source of the country’s 
foreign exchange earnings: the sector accounts for over 95% of 
Nigeria’s total foreign earnings and 85% of total government revenue 
(Ministry of Budget and National Planning, 2017 ). Lastly, with an 
average daily production of 1.92 million barrels/day and 36,972 
billion barrels of proven oil reserves, Nigeria occupies the 10th spot 
among countries with the largest crude oil reserves in the world 
(OPEC, 2019) as well as projected to be the 40th largest economy 
in the world (CBN, 2011; AfDBG, 2013). Although Nigeria’s stock 
of proven crude oil reserves dropped by 1.3% from its 2017 level of 
37,453, the aspiration of the government to expand the volume of the 
country’s proven oil reserves to the 40-billion-barrel mark and beyond 
by 2020 is still vigorously emphasized (Ejoh, 2017; OPEC, 2019).
Despite the key role that petroleum resources play in Nigeria’s 
economy, the sector is plagued with multifarious problems, chief 
among them being undue political interference and attendant 
erosion of accountability. Another serious problem with the sector 
has been lack of confidence by industry observers and stakeholders 
resulting in the loss of critical investments necessary to grow the 
sector to other countries (Shosanya, 2015). On the basis of the 
foregoing, pressures were mounted by major stakeholders for 
far-reaching reforms, hence the pioneering efforts in this regard 
by former president Olusegun Obasanjo in 2000 (NEITI, 2016). 
The initial bill transmitted to the National Assembly in 2008 for 
the reform of the petroleum sector was an omnibus executive bill 
known as the petroleum industry bill (PIB). Essentially, the key 
objective of the PIB is the enthronement of international best 
practices through the comprehensive review and harmonization 
of all legal instruments governing the petroleum sector as well as 
the establishment of strong institutions that transcend individual 
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or group manipulation (Abuh, 2019). The establishment of strong 
institutions will definitely eliminate bad governance that motorizes 
inefficiency, rent-seeking and corruption in the petroleum sector.
As a result of concerted opposition to the PIB by stakeholders, no 
consensus was reached to enable its passage. It took a total 10 years 
and several revisions of the PIB, including its balkanization into 
four separate bills (namely the petroleum industry governance bill, 
petroleum industry fiscal bill, petroleum industry administration bill, 
and petroleum Host and impacted community bill) for a headway to 
be made in 2018. The idea behind the balkanization of the PIB was 
to facilitate their easy passage. However, the breakthrough that was 
recorded in 2018 in terms of the passage of the first of the quadripartite 
bills, the petroleum industry governance bill (PIGB) and its subsequent 
transmission to the president for assent was a stillbirth as it was returned 
back to the National Assembly without being assented to.
This paper evaluated the trajectory of reform efforts in Nigeria’s 
petroleum sector since the initial groundwork was laid in 2000. 
The evaluation was guided by the question about whether indeed 
the governance and institutional structures in Nigeria’s petroleum 
sector were inadequate and out of sync with global best practice to 
necessitate a reform. A related preoccupation of the paper was whether 
the delays in passing the bills necessary to spearhead the reforms in 
the petroleum sector were justifiable. In engaging with the questions 
that formed the fulcrum of this study, the paper adopted key informant 
interview (KII) to generate its primary data. The study was further 
enriched with secondary data generated from archival materials. 
The paper found that major stakeholders are favorably disposed 
to a comprehensive overhaul of the governance and institutional 
structures of the petroleum industry. There is unanimity in the positive 
impacts that reform would bring to the petroleum sector. The paper 
also found that the age-long delays in passing the reform bill created 
uncertainties, which negatively impacted on the sector in terms of lost 
investments, inability to meet the target for the expansion of crude oil 
reserves and lack of new investments in the sector.
2. EFFORTS AT OIL SECTOR REFORMS 
SINCE 1999
The discovery of oil in commercial quantities in Nigeria in 1956 
and the subsequent appreciation of its price in the international oil 
market in the 1970s, led to a gradual abandonment of the range of 
agricultural produce, such as groundnut, cocoa, rubber and palm 
produce that had hitherto constituted the country’s economic 
mainstay. The emphasis on oil, which led to the erosion of the 
agricultural sector created the Dutch disease in the Nigerian 
economy. The Dutch disease syndrome that characterized the 
Nigerian economy during the 1970s diminished the role of the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors in national development 
(Olusi and Olagunju, 2005; Otaha, 2012). Apart from the retreat 
of these sectors in contributing to the foreign exchange earnings 
of Nigeria, the rentier system that emerged also created loopholes 
that undermined the effectiveness of harnessing the oil sector 
for national development (Ikpeze et al., 2004). Additionally, the 
non-adoption of international best practices in oil exploration and 
exploitation by operators created serious environmental crisis in 
the Niger Delta, thus triggering host community agitations and 
other forms of insecurity (Nwozor, 2019a, Nwozor et al., 2019b).
The Nigerian oil and gas sector is characterized by all manner of 
sharp practices, which created the imperative for its reform. The 
expectation was that the reform would induce the modernization 
of the sector and ultimately have multiplier effects on other sectors 
of the Nigerian economy (Adelegan, 2017). The imperative of a 
reform was underpinned by the disconnect between the petroleum 
sector and other sectors of the economy. In other words, the 
petroleum sector did not have the desired impact in terms of 
generating employment and contributing to the diversification of 
other sectors of the economy. The failure of oil and gas to induce 
economic growth and development necessitated the various 
attempts at reforms since 1999. The Obasanjo administration 
set up the oil and gas reform committee (OGRC) on April 24, 
2000 under the headship of the then honorary special adviser on 
energy and strategic matters, Rilwanu Lukman, to undertake a 
comprehensive study of the oil and gas industry, with the ultimate 
aim of reforming the sector. The major idea behind the attempt at 
reforming the petroleum sector was to boost Nigeria’s development 
by ensuring the appropriate and transparent management of oil 
revenues (Iledare 2008). The OGRC evolved a national oil and 
gas policy (NOGP) whose thrust was the restructuring of the oil 
and gas sector on the basis of separating commercial institutions 
from the regulatory and policy-making institutions (Iledare, 2008).
On June 21, 2005, the government constituted the oil and gas 
implementation committee (OGIC) to oversee the development of 
strategies for the implementation of the reform agenda in the NOGP 
document (NEITI, 2016). Another area that Obasanjo attempted 
to institute reform was the governance structure of the oil and gas 
sector, which was characterized by corruption. As part of efforts to 
deal with the corruption that typified the sector and thus enthrone 
transparency, accountability, and good governance, Nigeria adopted 
the principles of the extractive industry transparency initiative 
(EITI) through the NEITI Act signed into law by Obasanjo on 
May 26, 2007. The diligent implementation of the act led to the 
declaration of Nigeria as EITI compliant in March 2011 (AfDBG, 
2013). However, the Obasanjo administration left a lot of unfinished 
business with regard to the reform of Nigeria’s oil and gas sector.
Former Nigerian president between 2007 and 2010, Umaru 
Musa Yar’Adua, inherited the task of revitalizing the pursuit of 
reforms in the oil and gas sector from his predecessor, former 
president Obasanjo’s immediate successor, inherited the task 
of revitalizing the pursuit of reforms in the oil and gas sector. 
Yar’Adua reconstituted the OGIC on September 07, 2007. To 
ensure continuity, the Yar’Adua administration reappointed 
Lukman as the chairman of the committee. The mandate of the 
committee was to transform the oil and gas industry through 
the instrumentality of the NOGP, which had been approved by 
the federal executive council, into a model of functionality that 
ensures a long-term sustainability of the sector; greater efficiency, 
effectiveness and global competitiveness (NEITI, 2016; Nwapi, 
2020). The Lukman committee submitted its report on August 3, 
2008 and this formed the basis for the pockets of reforms in the 
oil and gas sector, especially the petroleum industry bill (PIB). 
Nwozor, et al.: Reform in a Limbo: The Politics and Politicization of Reforms in Nigeria’s Petroleum Sector
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 10 • Issue 4 • 2020186
Further attempt at reform led to the passage of the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry content development act on April 22, 2010 with 
focus on broadening indigenous participation in the oil and gas 
sector (Nwaokoro, 2011). Table 1 below shows the key phases of 
the tortuous timelines of the PIB. As at the end of 2019, no aspect 
of the reform bill has been concluded.
The Goodluck Jonathan administration (2010-2015) initiated a 
development initiative codenamed the transformation agenda. The 
agenda was conceptualized as a medium-term development plan to 
holistically address the challenges of development in Nigeria with 
the target being to transform and usher the country into the league 
of twenty largest economies in the world by 2020 (NPC, 2013; 
AfDBG, 2013). The major thrusts of the transformation agenda 
with regards to the oil and gas sector reforms revolved around:
i. Deregulating the oil sector with a view to promoting robust 
private sector investment
ii. Promoting the adoption of environmentally-friendly 
exploration and exploitation methods by oil sector operators
iii. Strengthening capacity building programs especially in core 
technical areas as part of national strategies for local content 
development
iv. Eliminating the menace of gas flaring with a view to achieving 
multiplier goals in terms of reducing pollution, increasing 
revenue and ensuring adequate gas supply for domestic use 
and power generation (NPC, 2011).
The oil and gas sector reforms under the auspices of the 
transformation agenda focused on both the upstream and 
downstream subsectors. Driving reforms in the upstream subsector 
with expected multiplier effect on the downstream sector was 
the petroleum industry bill (PIB). Similarly, neoliberal reforms, 
anchored on subsidy removal and the establishment of the Subsidy 
Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) constituted 
the ensemble of reforms in the downstream sector (Amakom, 2013).
3. THE URGENCY OF A COMPREHENSIVE 
REFORM AND THE PIB AS THE FLAGSHIP 
REFORM IN NIGERIA’S PETROLEUM 
SECTOR
The rationale behind the introduction of the PIB centered on 
strengthening the oil and gas sector in order to contribute more to 
the Nigerian economy. Thus, the key idea was to evolve an omnibus 
legal framework to anchor the various legislative, regulatory and 
fiscal policies in the country with a view to effectively dealing with 
oil exploration and exploitation fallouts as well as leveraging on 
the sector to deal with the challenges of pervasive corruption and 
lack of transparency (Gboyega et al, 2011; Usman, 2016). There 
was a consensus among stakeholders and political elites about the 
need to reform the oil and gas sector to deal with the perennial 
challenges of lack of transparency, accountability, and good 
governance. Notwithstanding the consensus among stakeholders, 
the PIB, which was designed to spearhead this reform, had many 
controversial provisions that attracted opposition (Usman, 2016). 
The result was that its enactment into law was stalled in the national 
assembly for 10 years.
3.1. The PIB: Anatomizing the Key Issues
The PIB represented a major move by the government to catalyze 
the transformation of Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. The PIB was an 
all-encompassing legislation that tended to unify and encapsulate 
the various laws in the oil and gas sector for the purpose of effective 
regulation. The PIB consisted of a single coherent document that 
embodied over 16 legislative and administrative instruments as 
well as the regulatory and fiscal policies and institutions governing 
Nigeria’s petroleum industry (NEITI, 2016; Usman, 2016). 
The PIB has been in the works since 2008 with all manner of 
controversies surrounding its fiscal and non-fiscal objectives. In 
2008, the PIB was sent to the national assembly as an executive 
Table 1: A summary of the long-winding journey of the PIB
Timeline Key action/deliverable
April 2000 President Obasanjo inaugurated the oil and gas 
reform committee (OGRC) on April 24, 2000 
under the headship of the then honorary special 
adviser on energy and strategic matters, Rilwanu 
Lukman
June 2005 The OGRC evolved a national oil and gas policy 
(NOGP). The Obasanjo government constituted 
the oil and gas implementation committee 
(OGIC) to implement the recommendations of 
the reforms committee as contained in NOGP
September 2007 President Umaru Yar’adua, approved the national 
oil and gas policy (NOGP), and reconstituted the 
OGIC to implement the NOGP
September 2008 A petroleum industry bill (PIB) was presented to 
the 6th national assembly
January 2012 The presidency under Goodluck Jonathan raised 
a task force to evaluate the bill, which was 
further enhanced and re-presented to the National 
Assembly
July 2012 The report of the special taskforce was submitted 
to national assembly after approval by the federal 
executive council
November 2013 National assembly concludes public hearing on 
PIB
2014 Revised version of PIB was again presented to 
the national assembly, owing to confusion due to 
conflicting versions in circulation
2016 Nigeria’s eight legislative assembly broke the 
PIB into four separate bills in order to minimize 
opposition, namely, the petroleum industry 
governance bill (PIGB), petroleum industry fiscal 
bill (PIFB), petroleum industry administration 
bill (PIAB), and petroleum host and impacted 
community bill (PHICB)
April 2016 Petroleum industry governance bill (PIGB) was 
laid before the senate/house of representatives
May 2017 The Nigerian senate passed the senate version of 
the PIGB.
January 2018 The house of representatives passed the house 
version of the PIGB.
March 2018 The two versions of the PIGB were harmonized 
and passed by both chambers of the national 
assembly
July 2018 The harmonized copy of the PIGB was 
transmitted by the national assembly to the 
president for assent on 3 July
July 2018 The president communicated his decision 
to decline assent to the PIGB on grounds of 
constitutional and legal inadequacies on 29 July
Compiled by the authors from several sources
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bill. The opposition to some aspects of its provisions, especially 
from investors and stakeholders, made the government to take a 
second look at it through a federal inter-agency technical review 
team.
The inter-agency team headed by Tim Okon (the then Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation’s Group General Manager on 
Corporate Planning and Strategy) submitted its report in 2010, 
which stirred more controversies as it introduced more stringent 
fiscal provisions that guaranteed a higher share of oil revenues 
to the Nigerian state. The controversies surrounding the PIB 
were very deep, considering that in 2011 three versions of the 
bill existed, namely the version presented by the executive, the 
version adopted by the Senate and the one adopted by the House 
of Representatives (Pérouse, 2014). In addition, there were 
disagreements among members of the National Assembly on 
whether to continue where the sixth legislative assembly (2007-
2011) stopped or to request the re-presentation of the bill afresh for 
consideration. But the presidency raised a task force to evaluate the 
bill, which was further enhanced and re-presented to the national 
assembly on 19 July 2012 (Pérouse, 2014).
The 2012 version of the PIB was an elaborate document designed 
to correct all that was wrong with Nigeria’s oil and gas sector 
(AfDBG, 2013; Usman, 2016). It was a 223-page tome divided 
into nine parts comprising 362 sections and five schedules, which 
covered the broad spectra of the oil and gas sector. The overarching 
objectives of the PIB centered on creating a conducive operational 
environment that would be promotive of safety and protective of 
the environment, optimizing revenues accruing to the government 
and evolving a progressive fiscal framework that would encourage 
further investment in the petroleum industry (The Petroleum 
Industry Bill, 2012).
The PIB was designed to update, modernize and streamline earlier 
legislations that no longer met the watermark of international 
trends in the oil and gas industry. The outdated legislations to be 
replaced included the petroleum profit tax act of 1959, amended 
in 1967, 1970, 1973 and 1979; mineral oils (safety) regulations, 
1963; oil pipeline act 1956, amended in 1965; petroleum act 
1969 and petroleum (drilling and production) regulations, 1969 
with amendments in 1973, 1979, 1995, 1996 and petroleum 
(amendment) decree 1996; the Nigerian National Oil Corporation 
(NNOC) Decree No 18 of 1971; Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation Decree 1977; Associated Gas Re-injection Decree 
1979, amended in 1985 and the Associated Gas Framework 
Agreement (AGFA) of 1992; Financial (Miscellaneous Taxation 
Provision) Act of 1998; Financial (Miscellaneous Taxation 
Provision) Amendment Act of 1999; Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas 
(NLNG) Act of 1999; Downstream Gas Act (DGA) and Natural 
Gas Fiscal Reform (NAGFRA) Act of 2005 (Section 354, The 
Petroleum Industry Bill, 2012).
On the basis of its elaborate provisions, the PIB represented not 
only the most detailed framework for boosting Nigeria’s petroleum 
revenue system but also a platform for repositioning the Nigerian 
state as a major player in the oil and gas sector (AfDBG, 2013; 
Pérouse, 2014). Essentially, the PIB was designed to holistically 
address fiscal and non-fiscal aspects of the oil and gas sector. The 
fiscal aspect was envisaged to expand the country’s revenue base 
and thus put more money into the coffers of the government while 
cutting down associated wastes. The strategies for achieving this 
fiscal objective included simplifying the collection of government 
revenues; creaming off windfall profits in case of high oil prices; 
collecting more revenues from large profitable fields in the 
deep offshore waters; and, creating employment and business 
opportunities, by encouraging investment in small oil and gas 
fields (Ukiwo, 2018).
The philosophy that underpinned the fiscal reform in the PIB 
was motorized by three major considerations: the first was 
the imperative to expand revenue accruals from oil due to the 
projections of global oil peak and decline as well as the forecasts 
that Nigeria’s proven crude oil reserve could last between 40 and 
50 years (Peterside, 2004; Akuru and Okoro, 2011). The second 
was the need to plug various loopholes through which enormous 
oil revenues were lost on daily basis (AfDBG, 2013; NEITI, 
2016). The third, and lastly, was the urgent need to prudently 
manage and maximize accruals from crude oil and gas in order 
to ensure the diversification of the economy and the deepening of 
the country’s socio-economic development (Gboyega et al., 2011). 
Notwithstanding projections of peak and decline in Nigeria’s oil 
reserves, the quest of the government to expand the country’s 
proven oil reserves to the 40-billion-barrel mark by 2020, the 
discovery of new oil fields and the development of technologies 
for recovering additional supplies have all rolled back the dismal 
picture of dry oil wells in the nearest future (Akuru and Okoro, 
2011; Ejoh, 2017).
3.2. The 2012 PIB: Evaluating the Fiscal and 
Non-fiscal Aspects
Relying on an extensive revision of allowable deductions for tax 
purposes, the fiscal framework in the PIB devised a simplified 
collection format. Under the proposed arrangement, only direct 
costs incurred in petroleum operations would be eligible for 
deductions. Thus, the emphasis was on a progressive fiscal 
framework that would encourage further investment in the industry 
whilst increasing accruable revenues to government (Section 1[d], 
The Petroleum Industry Bill, 2012). The fiscal reform proposed the 
replacement of the cost-based incentives with production-based 
incentives based on the consideration that government revenues 
are impacted by oil production and efficient cost management. 
The implication of this was the imposition of strict discipline on 
cost escalations and “de-incentivization” of gold-plating. The tax 
computation was simplified with no company likely to enjoy tax 
exemption. The oil companies would pay tax on a percentage of the 
chargeable profits as follows: 50% for onshore and shallow water 
areas and 25% for frontier acreage and deep-water areas (Section 
313, subsection 1, The Draft Petroleum Industry Bill, 2012).
One of the major flaws in the fiscal provisions in the 2012 version of 
the PIB was the omission of some important provisions that were in 
earlier versions. For example, earlier versions of the PIB provided 
for priced-based progressive royalties. But this was missing in the 
PIB 2012 version. Within the context of priced-based progressive 
royalties, the share of accruable royalties would increase in line 
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with high oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) prices beyond a 
certain threshold. The idea was to capture windfall revenues 
during high oil price situations. Analysts considered the omission 
as a serious basis for loss to the Nigerian economy considering 
that in situations of high prices and associated windfalls only oil 
and gas companies would benefit to the detriment of the country 
(Van Meurs, 2012). This omission detracted from one of the key 
objectives of the PIB in terms of optimizing the revenues accruing 
to the country.
Another serious flaw in the 2012 PIB was the retention of the 
current practice that created loopholes for stealing Nigerian oil 
and gas. Oil theft in various dimensions have always being a 
major challenge in Nigeria’s oil sector. For instance, a recent 
report by the Nigerian extractive industries transparency initiative 
(NEITI) indicated that between 2009 and 2018, Nigeria lost 
about US$41.9 billion to oil theft (NEITI, 2019). The oil thieves 
normally exploit various systemic loopholes in both the upstream 
and downstream subsectors. According the NEITI report already 
referred to, the breakdown of the losses indicated that Nigeria 
lost over 505 million barrels of crude oil and 4.2 billion liters of 
refined petroleum products valued at $40.06 billion and $1.84 
billion respectively. A further breakdown showed that while 
crude oil theft accounted for about US$38.5 billion, the domestic 
crude losses and refined petroleum product losses accounted for 
US$1.56 billion and US$1.84 billion respectively (NEITI, 2019). 
A disaggregated picture of the average losses to the Nigerian 
economy in the past 10 years showed a consistent daily loss of 
US$11.47 million daily or monthly loss of US$349 million or 
yearly loss of US$4.2 billion dollars.
The current operational modalities in the oil industry tend to 
create exploitable loopholes for oil thieves. Under the current 
arrangement, the measurement of petroleum production output 
is done at a point down the line where oil or gas is delivered or 
sold, that is at the terminals instead of at the wellheads of flow 
stations (Van Meurs, 2012; Katsouris and Sayne, 2013; Nnodim, 
2019). What this means is that the figures often presented by 
regulatory agencies are estimates as there is no appropriate method 
of measuring the amount of oil exploited in order to accurately 
calculate the amount stolen at the source. This practice is contrary 
to international practice of measuring oil and gas production in the 
fields, directly where oil or gas leaves the field area (Van Meurs, 
2012). The retention of the current practice in the 2012 PIB created 
a distinct possibility that the stealing and diversion of oil or gas 
before it is measured would continue.
The 2012 PIB also has non-fiscal provisions, which essentially 
targeted the institutional and policy-making frameworks of the oil 
and gas industry. There is a general agreement among stakeholders 
and the government about the inadequacy of contemporary 
institutions in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector to drive any major 
change or reposition the sector for enhanced role. The central 
issue in institutional reform was the unbundling of the state-owned 
national oil company, the Nigerian national petroleum corporation 
(NNPC). The rationale for the proposal was to enable the 
separation of functions necessary for effectiveness and efficiency in 
the sector. This entailed the distribution of the functions of policy 
formulation, regulatory, monitoring, and commercial operations 
to various institutions.
According to the 2012 PIB, the unbundling of the NNPC would 
lead to the creation of some specialized companies whose focus 
would cover the development and promotion of indigenous 
operational capacity; the management of joint ventures (JV) and 
other NNPC’s assets; and catering for domestic gas marketing 
and gas infrastructure development. Other areas of focus included 
the regulation of oil and gas production, enforcement of laws, 
granting of licenses and carrying out bid licensing rounds; carrying 
out duties hitherto performed by NNPC’s frontier exploration 
service as well as assisting the minister of petroleum resources 
in formulating strategies; and the regulation of the downstream 
sector (The Draft Petroleum Industry Bill, 2012).
Another aspect of the non-fiscal reform was the provision for the 
creation of the Petroleum Host Community Fund (PHCF) (Sections 
116-118, The Petroleum Industry Bill, 2012). This represented a 
novel provision that conferred relevance to communities where oil 
wells are domiciled. It was essentially designed to create a sense 
of communal ownership of oil installations, provide resources for 
developmental assistance and curb restiveness and militancy in oil 
producing communities. The PHCF was envisaged to be funded 
by upstream petroleum companies through the remittance of 
10% of their net profits from operations in the onshore areas and 
in the offshore shallow water areas directly into the PHCF on a 
monthly basis. The caveat in the bill was that communities would 
be disqualified from benefitting from the fund if there was any act 
of vandalism, sabotage of the upstream facilities allocated to them 
or civil unrest. Under such circumstance, the erring community 
would forfeit its entitlement, which would be diverted to the repair 
and remediation of associated damages (Section 118[5], The Draft 
Petroleum Industry Bill, 2012).
3.3. Opposition and Contending Issues in the 2012 PIB
Despite the acknowledgement by stakeholders, industry operators 
and analysts about the elaborateness and necessity of the 2012 
PIB, its consideration in the national assembly was stalled due 
to opposition to some of its provisions as well as concern about 
profitability and long-term sustainability of production by oil 
companies (Ugwuanyi, 2013; Pérouse, 2014). Notwithstanding 
the assurances by the government that the proposed changes in 
the fiscal architecture in the petroleum sector would still yield the 
same level of profitability as well as improve the economics of 
small fields significantly through generous production allowances 
and smaller royalty rates, the controversies and opposition to the 
bill continued, which ultimately blocked its passage into law.
The international oil companies (IOCs) and other stakeholders as 
well as some segments of the Nigerian state stoutly opposed the 
2012 PIB for various reasons. Operating under the aegis of oil 
producers trade section (OPTS), 18 international and indigenous 
oil companies in Nigeria mounted sustained opposition to the PIB. 
While agreeing that the PIB possessed a unique opportunity to 
resolve the numerous challenges confronting the oil and gas sector, 
the OPTS posited that its provisions tended to aggravate rather than 
resolve them, thus potentially threatening investment potentials in 
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the sector (Ugwuanyi, 2013; Wahab and Diji, 2017). The crux of 
their opposition was the fiscal regime in the PIB, which the OPTS 
considered very harsh. The contention of the OPTS was that the 
proposed fiscal regime in the PIB significantly increased royalties 
and taxes instead of balancing them in terms of high royalties 
with lower taxes and vice versa. The group held that the proposed 
fiscal regime would increase their operational cost, undermine the 
profitability of their operations and serve as a disincentive, which 
ultimately would shut out investments necessary to grow the oil 
sector (Sweet Crude Report, 2013; Wahab and Diji, 2017).
Another area of contention was the gas sub-sector. The OPTS said 
the low-regulated domestic gas price, the enormous expenditure 
required to develop gas infrastructure and the high tax rate of 
80% would create serious impediments to investment. Their 
recommendation was anchored on an incentive-based approach 
to domestic obligations as the best way to achieve the gas 
development and gas revolution needed by Nigeria (Sweet Crude 
Report, 2013). Other areas of concern highlighted by the OPTS 
and stakeholders like NEITI included: the difficulty that would 
arise in connection with oil exploration and exploitation due to the 
limiting of license area to field size with only a small perimeter 
boundary; retroactive provisions that conduce to the reversal of 
clauses in existing contracts to reflect the new fiscal regimes; the 
revocation of acreage that is yet to be developed by the allocated 
owners; extensive powers conferred on the minister; and agitation 
for regulatory independence (Sweet Crude Report, 2013; Wahab 
and Diji, 2017).
In addition to the foregoing opposition mounted by MNOCs 
and NEITI to the PIB, some former northern governors notably, 
Mu’azu Babangida Aliyu of Niger and Ramalan Yero of Kaduna 
states as well as the northern caucus in the National Assembly 
kicked against the proposed 10% host community fund (Sweet 
Crude Report, 2013; Ugwuanyi, 2013). They opposed the PIB on 
two interrelated grounds: firstly, that the Niger Delta already has 
a plethora of platforms through which it is adequately catered for, 
such as 13% statutory derivation from the Federation Account, 
the federal budgetary allocation to the Ministry of Niger Delta, 
the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), and the 
Niger Delta Amnesty program. And lastly, that the proposed 10% 
earmarked for oil-producing communities might negatively affect 
the fiscal health of their states owing to the attendant loss of 10% 
of national income to the PHCF (Ugwuanyi, 2013). The revenue 
mobilization allocation and fiscal commission (RMAFC) also 
opposed the PHCF on the ground that it would put pressure on 
its purse (Sweet Crude Report, 2013).
4. ROAD TO A COMPROMISE: 
BALKANIZING THE PIB FOR NATIONAL 
SUPPORT
Since 2008 when the PIB was first sent as an executive bill to the 
national assembly, it had undergone several modifications, the 
major one being in 2012. However, the sixth and seventh legislative 
assemblies of Nigeria’s National Assembly were unable to broker 
national consensus to pass it into law. The impasse that dogged the 
PIB was demonstrative of how strongly the various interests that 
opposed some of its provisions felt about them and how unwilling 
they were to see the bill become law. From the various submissions 
of the various interest groups ranging from the IOCs, indigenous 
operators, regulators to other stakeholders, it was deducible that 
while they supported a holistic reform of the oil sector, and by 
extension the proposed PIB, yet they were strongly opposed to 
several of its provisions. Within the context of the foregoing, the 
eighth legislative assembly (2015-2019) adopted the strategy of 
breaking the omnibus bill into different thematic bills.
The non-passage of the PIB has had implications on the oil sector 
in particular and the Nigerian economy in general. Analysts have 
contended that the non-passage of the PIB created uncertainty in 
the oil sector, thus leading to the deferment of core investments, 
decline in revenues accruing to the government, contraction in the 
production and reserve profiles, and the erosion of the country’s 
competitive attractiveness in the gas sector (NEITI, 2016; Wahab 
and Diji, 2017). The direct consequence of these developments 
has been the loss of investments to such countries as Ghana, 
Kenya, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Uganda, with the worth of 
such foregone investments estimated at over US$100 billion 
(Shosanya, 2015; NEITI, 2016). The estimated rate of loss in terms 
of withheld or diverted investments due to the non-passage was 
US$15 billion annually (The Nation, 2017; Asu, 2018). On the 
whole, analysts have estimated that Nigeria has lost over US$200 
billion directly and directly as a result of the non-passage of the 
PIB (NEITI, 2016; The Nation, 2017). These losses prompted 
the eight legislative assembly to seek for ways to address the 
logjam that blocked the processing of the PIB. The way out of 
the logjam was the balkanization of the bill into parts to facilitate 
quick legislative reviews and passage.
Thus, in 2016, the PIB was broken into four separate bills in order to 
minimize opposition, manage areas of controversy and contention 
against it and fast-track its passage into law (Asu, 2018). The 
emerging bills from this arrangement are the petroleum industry 
governance bill (PIGB), petroleum industry fiscal bill (PIFB), 
petroleum industry administration bill (PIAB), and petroleum host 
and impacted community bill (PHICB). The strategy of the National 
Assembly is to process these bills one after the other starting with 
the petroleum industry governance bill (PIGB).
It would appear that the choice of starting with the PIGB was 
predicated on the overall trajectory of the opposition to the 
hitherto PIB. In other words, the PIGB presented a more promising 
prospect of success in terms of garnering support necessary for its 
passage. The Nigerian Senate and house of representatives passed 
the PIGB on May 25, 2017 and January 17, 2018 respectively 
(Ovuakporie, 2018). After the harmonization of the two versions 
of the PIGB passed both chambers of the national assembly in 
March 2018, it was transmitted to the president for his assent. 
However, the president declined assent to the bill.
4.1. The Key Thrust of the PIGB
The PIGB is one of the quadripartite bills carved out from the 
erstwhile omnibus PIB. The PIGB focuses on reforming the 
governance and institutional framework of the oil and gas sector.
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Figure 1 shows the major objectives of the PIGB. The PIGB is 
generally seen as an important piece of legislation with potential 
to facilitate the influx of massive investments into Nigeria’s oil 
and gas sector. The PIGB’s emphasis is the overhauling of the 
governance and institutional framework of the industry in terms of:
i) Complete unbundling of the NNPC
ii) Replacing the NNPC with three entities that would assume 
responsibility for various aspects of its liabilities. These new 
entities include: The national petroleum company (NPC) to 
handle joint venture assets in the upstream sector; the Nigeria 
petroleum assets management company (NPAMC) saddled 
with overseeing the production sharing contract assets; 
and the Nigerian petroleum liability management company 
(NPLMC) which would assume the responsibility of managing 
the liabilities of the NNPC and the pensions liabilities of the 
department of petroleum resources (DPR)
iii) Establishing additional entities, namely, the ministry of 
petroleum incorporated (MOPI) and Nigeria petroleum 
liability management company, from the ashes of the NNPC
iv) Fusing the current DPR, petroleum product pricing regulatory 
agency (PPPRA) and the Petroleum Inspectorate into a new 
independent regulatory commission known as the Nigerian 
petroleum regulatory commission (NPRC)
v) Imposing 5% levy on all fuel sold and distributed in Nigeria 
subject to the approval of the minister of petroleum resources
vi) Establishing petroleum equalization fund (PEF) whose 
sources of funding include the 5% fuel levy, subventions, fees 
and charges for services rendered as well as the net surplus 
revenues recovered from petroleum products marketing 
companies (Figure 2).
A major the departure of the PIGB from previous legislations 
in the petroleum sector is in the drastic reduction of the powers 
vested in the office of the minister of petroleum resources. 
In sundry legislations guiding operations in the petroleum 
industry, the minister exercises discretionary powers that span 
granting, renewing, extending or revoking licenses and leases 
for oil exploration and exploitation. In the PIGB, the powers 
hitherto exercised by the minister, namely, issuance, renewal or 
cancellation of licenses, leases or grants are vested in the Nigeria 
petroleum regulatory commission (NPRC). The NPRC serves as 
the petroleum industry’s supervisory body. Within its ambit, the 
NPRC is empowered to exercise powers and perform functions 
within the purview of the DPR, PPPRA, and the Petroleum 
Inspectorate. The NPRC, as a successor regulator, assumes the 
assets and liabilities of the replaced agencies.
4.2. The Politics Within: Different Interpretations of 
Presidential Decline
Following the passage of the PIGB by both chambers of the 
national assembly and subsequent harmonization in March 
2018, the national assembly transmitted the harmonized bill to 
the president on July 03, 2018 for his assent (Umoru, 2018). The 
transmission of the PIGB (the first of the quadripartite bills on 
the reform of the petroleum sector) to the president for assent 
represented some sort of victory considering that it took 10 years 
for this accomplishment.
The president literally shocked industry observers and stakeholders 
when, on July 29, 2018, he communicated his decision to 
decline assent to the PIGB on grounds of constitutional and legal 
inadequacies (The Nation, 2018). The areas of conflict raised as 
underpinning the presidential decline are:
i. The provision empowering the NPRC to retain 10% of the 
revenues generated on behalf of the government (as contained 
in section 26[3] of the harmonized PIGB). The president 
believes that this provision would lead to an increment in 
the funds available to the commission while concomitantly 
starving governments across all levels of needed revenues
ii. The expansion of the scope of the petroleum equalization 
fund (PEF) and inclusion of some provisions, which place 
the fund at variance with the economic policy thrust of the 
buhari administration
iii. Legislative drafting anomalies with potentiality to create 
ambiguities, which could lead to conflicts in interpretation 






























Figure 2: Key institutional frameworks in the petroleum industry 
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Figure 1: Major objectives of the petroleum industry governance bill
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Some analysts have contended that the NPRC seems like a new 
behemoth replacing another behemoth, the NNPC. The PIGB 
endows the NPRC with enormous powers, which in the view 
of industry observers and analysts could spawn the ground for 
abuse and bureaucratic inefficiency (SDN, 2018). But beyond 
this speculation, the president’s justification is that the retention 
of 10% by the NPRC would unduly increase its financial profile to 
the detriment of accruable revenues to the federal government as 
well as other component units consisting of states, federal capital 
territory (FCT) and local government councils. The implication, 
therefore, is that the percentage of revenue to be retained by the 
NPRC should be pruned down so as not to create cash crunch for 
the various level of government. A 2018 report on the viability of 
Nigeria’s 36 states showed that 17 states were insolvent as their 
internally generated revenues (IGR) constituted <10% of their 
receipts from Nigeria’s Federation Account (Odunsi, 2019). The 
insolvency of the majority of states in Nigeria due to their weak 
capacity to generate reasonable volume of revenue within their 
states is responsible for their dependence on federal allocations 
for survival. In other words, without monthly receipts from the 
Federation Account, many states would be unviable and incapable 
of meeting their financial obligations including paying salaries 
of their workforce (Odunsi, 2019; Izevbigie and Ebohon, 2019). 
Apart from possible reduction in the accruals to the various 
governments, some analysts have contended that the proposed 
retention of 10% by NPRC is too much and could make it a 
reincarnation of NNPC in terms of arbitrary withholding of receipts 
meant for the Federation Account. The NNPC is notorious for 
withholding billions of dollars meant for the Federation Account 
every year without a clear or defined repayment plan (Ohaeri 
and Diminas, 2018). According to NEITI (2017), findings from 
a series of audits of the oil and gas sector showed that the NNPC 
and its upstream arm, Nigerian petroleum development Company 
(NPDC), failed to remit $21.778 billion and N316.074 billion to 
the federation account.
The centrality of the petroleum in Nigeria’s economy coupled with 
massive corruption associated with the sector had led Buhari to 
assign the ministerial portfolio of the sector to himself. The various 
provisions in the PIGB drastically whittled down the power of the 
minister. Thus, it has been suggested that beyond the issues raised 
by the president as constituting the grounds for his decline, the real 
area of contention should be seen within the context of the erosion 
of the power of the minister, which he currently holds (The Nation, 
2018;). The letter conveying the president’s decline did not have 
a proposal about specific changes expected to be effected on the 
bill to make it acceptable. However, a rework of the PIGB must 
address the observations of the president. This, therefore, requires 
that the national assembly must embark on wide consultations 
necessary to produce an acceptable version of the PIGB.
5. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that Nigeria’s petroleum sector is poorly 
managed and therefore requires a fundamental reform. Our 
respondents are unanimous in their belief that the quadripartite bills 
would address all the ills in the petroleum industry. Specifically 
they believed that the PIGB would catalyze development in the 
petroleum sector, create the necessary enabling environment 
to attract massive investment into the sector, and thus position 
Nigeria as a world leader in the global petroleum industry, facilitate 
the expansion of Nigeria’s oil reserve and enthrone peace in oil 
production activities by stabilizing relationship between host 
communities and industry players.
However, the politicization of the reform process, which made 
the passage of the original reform bill, the PIB, impossible thus 
necessitating its balkanization, is yet to be resolved. Considering 
the unanimity of stakeholders on the imperative of reforms in the 
petroleum sector and the hard-work put in packaging the PIGB, 
the refusal of Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria’s president, to assent 
to it was quite unfortunate. Anecdotal evidence and calculations 
by analysts have suggested that Nigeria has lost over US$200 
billion directly and directly as a result of the non-passage of the 
PIB (NEITI, 2016; The Nation, 2017). The continued delay in 
passing the quadripartite bills would undermine the sector and 
decelerate the pace of economic development, both of which have 
serious implications for meeting the sustainable development 
goals. The imperative of passing the reform bills is underscored 
by the general unwillingness of major petroleum industry players 
to commit their funds in an atmosphere of regulatory uncertainty, 
which the non-passage of the reform bills has created. According 
to US Energy Information Administration (2016. p. 4), “regulatory 
uncertainty has resulted in fewer investments in new oil and natural 
gas projects, and no licensing round has occurred since 2007.”
This paper recommends that the presidency should downplay the 
politicization of the petroleum sector reforms by deemphasizing 
the whittling down of the powers of the Minister. The key 
considerations should be whether the PIGB is in line with 
global best practices, whether its provisions would lead to better 
management of the sector and thus translate to efficiency in the 
operations of the sector, and whether it would ensure operational 
transparency, plug wastes and lead to more revenues for the 
country. Thus the quadripartite bills should be expeditiously 
processed and passed into law so that the country can usher in a 
new era in its petroleum industry.
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